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INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF DIVIDING




The Montana Legislature adopted a modified version of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) in the 1975 legislative
session, effective for all dissolutions of marriage occurring after
January 1, 1976.1 Professor Herma Hill Kay, co-reporter of the
commission that formulated the UMDA, summarized the intended
thrust of the Act as an elimination of fault from the dissolution,
maintenance and property disposition aspects of a dissolution of
marriage; to substitute a "non-judgmental" process for the prior
assignment of fault process under earlier law.2
The implementation of a "non-judgmental" disposition of
property has been the subject of many decisions by the Montana
Supreme Court since the enactment of the UMDA in Montana.
Accordingly, the guidelines to be used by the district courts in set-
tling a division of marital property are becoming fixed. Little judi-
cial attention, however, has been given to the income tax conse-
quences that result from a division of property in Montana.
Contrary to the intent of all concerned, including the courts, a
seemingly "non-judgmental" property settlement may result in un-
expected economic hardship when income tax liability for the year
of settlement is determined.
The central purpose of this article is to assist practitioners in
determining and minimizing the adverse income tax consequences
of a division of property. The complex rules in this area of income
taxation are mainly concerned with the title to the property,
whether the property is separately or jointly owned. While these
rules seem, at times, to stray far afield, the basic premise, as devel-
oped in this article, remains the same: all transfers of separately
owned property are taxable; divisions of "jointly owned" property
in accordance with the property interests of each spouse are
nontaxable.
After discussing the tax consequences of transferring sepa-
* B.A., Montana State University, 1974; J.D., University of San Diego School of Law,
1977; LL.M., University of Denver. Mr. Munson is a partner with the law firm of Aronow,
Anderson, Beatty & Lee in Denver, Colorado.
1. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-101 through -225 (1981).
2. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act Seminar, 1975 Proc. Mont. B. 2.
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rately owned and jointly owned property, the article arrives at the
suggestion that Montana law on property settlements encourages
taxpayers, for Federal income tax purposes, to divide jointly owned
property at the transfer or division of the marital property. To
fully comprehend the effect of this suggestion, it is necessary to
investigate all tax aspects of the division of jointly owned property,
including the rules that have developed concerning joint ownership
in community property states. Finally, the article concludes with a
discussion of the role that district court judges must play in deter-
mining tax consequences of a property settlement ordered or ap-
proved by the court.
II. DIVISION OF SEPARATELY OWNED PROPERTY
A summary of the tax rules that apply to a property settle-
ment involving the transfer of separately owned property in a non-
community property law state is shown by the following example:
Husband' owns a parcel of real property which he bought in 1965
for $10,000 for investment purposes. In 1970 husband and wife
are married and the property is worth $15,000. In 1982 the parties
are divorced and husband transfers the property to wife pursuant
to an amicable property settlement in return for wife releasing
her marital rights in other property being retained by the hus-
band, title to which is also in husband. At the execution of the
deed conveying the real property, the parcel is worth $50,000, and
the aggregate value of the property retained by husband is
$50,000.
The division seems equitable, but an examination of the tax conse-
quences reveals the tax and hence economic inequity created by
the division:
(1) Husband has realized a gain of $40,000, the character of
which will be capital gain due to the investment nature of the
asset. Because the capital asset has been held for more than one
year, the gain is long term capital gain (LTCG). This gain is fully
taxable to husband in the year the property is transferred. Al-
though long term capital gain is taxed at very advantageous rates,
$16,000 is taxed as additional income to husband in 1982. 4
(2) The Internal Revenue Service (Service) takes the position5
3. References to "husband" are intended to apply equally to the situation in which the
transferor is the wife. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(17) (1982).
4. The $16,000 amount is arrived at by reducing the gross amount of long term capital
gain by I.R.C. § 1202 (1982) "Capital Gains Deduction" which is equal to 60% of the gross
figure and assumes that husband has no capital losses in the year of transfer.
5. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 2 C.B. 63.
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that wife has no gain upon the release of her marital rights in
consideration for the conveyance of the land.
(3) Wife takes as her basis in the property received the fair mar-
ket value of the property on the date of transfer.' Thus, in the
example, the wife's basis for determining gain or loss on future
disposition of the property is $50,000. If wife holds the property
for investment, making it a capital asset to her, and further, if she
holds it for the requisite one year period, any amount she realizes
from a sale of the property in excess of her basis of $50,000, will
be taxed at the favorable long term capital gain rates. Obviously,
wife can sell the property for $50,000 or less, and have no tax
liability.
A. United States v. Davis: The Source of the Rules
These consequences are dictated by the United States Su-
preme Court decision in United States v. Davis.7 Davis arose in
Delaware, a noncommunity property law state as is Montana. The
case involved a transfer by the husband of some individually
owned, and appreciated, property incident to a dissolution of mar-
riage. The Service taxed the transfer, treating it as a sale of the
property at its fair market value. The initial question presented to
the Court was whether the transfer was taxable. The Court ex-
amined several basic concepts of the income tax codified in certain
sections of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). Section 61(a)(3)
provides that gross income includes all income, regardless of its
source, including gains derived from dealing in property. Under
section 1001(a), gain from the sale or other disposition of property
is the excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis as de-
termined under section 1011. Section 1001(b) defines the "amount
realized" as the sum of any money received plus the fair market
value of other property received. The entire amount of the gain
realized under section 1001, must be "recognized" under section
1001(c) unless provided otherwise in the Code.'
Finding that these general rules of taxation applied to the
transfer, the Court held that the husband's transfer of appreciated
shares of stock in full satisfaction of all claims and rights that the
wife might have against the husband resulted in taxable gain to
6. Id.
7. 370 U.S. 64 (1962).
8. If gain is "recognized," it is subjected to taxation in the tax year it is realized. A
common "nonrecognition" provision is I.R.C. § 1033 (1982) commonly known as a "like-
kind" exchange. Under nonrecognition, the gain is deferred and subjected to taxation in
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the husband. In reversing the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court
found that Congress, through section 61(a)(3), intended to tax any
and all appreciation of property.'
Under the Court's analysis, the only issue presented was when
the appreciation should be taxed. Two options were available to
the Court: (1) impose the tax on the transfer to the wife; or
(2) impose the tax when the wife sells or disposes of the property
received in the settlement. In holding that the former option was
the proper consequence in this case, the Court rejected the hus-
band's argument that the transfer was merely a nontaxable divi-
sion of property between co-owners. The Court analyzed the rights
granted to the wife under Delaware law and found that the wife's
rights were not those of a co-owner of property, but rather were a
"personal liability" of the husband.10
The Court found that the husband received "property" in ex-
change for his transfer in the form of the release of wife's inchoate
marital rights." The Court established the value of these rights by
relying on a Court of Claims case which held that if there is an
arms length dealing between two individuals, the values of the two
properties exchanged are either equal in fact or are presumed to be
equal.12 The Court admitted that there were problems with view-
ing the property settlement as an arms length transaction due to
the emotions and tensions involved along with practical necessities
dictated by the divorce and property settlement,"3 but the Court
concluded that it was inconsistent with the purpose and scheme of
taxation to ignore the tax consequences of the transfer."
The Court, in a footnote, recognized the Service's view that no
gain is realized by the wife in these situations. 5 The Court also
states in Davis that the wife's basis in the shares of stock she re-
ceived is equal to the fair market value of the property released by
her,e which of course is equal to the fair market value of the stock
received from the husband.
B. Application of the Rules
The message from the United States Supreme Court in Davis
9. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 64, 68 (1962).
10. Id. at 70.
11. Id. at 72.
12. Id. The Court relied on Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F.
Supp. 184, 189 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 72, 73.
15. Id. at 73, n. 8.
16. Id. at 73.
[Vol. 44
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 44 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/2
TAX CONSEQUENCES
is clear: a transfer by the husband to the wife of separately owned
appreciated property will result in taxable gain to the husband.
The following example shows the disaster that may result from a
transfer of separately owned property:
Husband, a single man, buys 10,000 acres of grassland from
his widowed mother at $10 per acre in 1945. In 1952, husband and
wife are married and from that date forward wife works with hus-
band on the ranch. Cattle are purchased and sold by husband and
wife as joint owners. The title to the grassland however remains
in husband alone.
In 1982, husband and wife are divorced. Proceeds in the bank
accounts are divided equally and, in recognition of wife's twenty-
nine years of labor and contribution, the district court orders an
equal division of the 10,000 acres of unencumbered grassland.
Without much thought as to tax consequences, husband exe-
cutes a deed to wife conveying 5000 acres to wife on the 15th of
September, 1982, the date of the divorce decree. Upon audit of
the husband's 1982 tax return, the Service assesses a tax defi-
ciency based on the transfer. It is determined that in 1982 a
neighbor made a bona fide offer to purchase the grassland from
husband at $125 per acre. No other evidence being available, $125
per acre is determined to be the fair market value of the land.
What appeared to be "an equal division" of property is now
transformed into a tax trap:
Husband has a taxable gain of $115 per acre or a total gain of
$575,000 computed as follows: Amount realized ($625,000) less
husband's adjusted basis ($50,000) equals gain realized of
$575,000, which will be "recognized". This gain will qualify for
long term capital gain treatment under Section 1231(b) and
1222(3) of the Code, and assuming that husband has no other
capital transactions in 1982, $230,000 of that gain will be taxable
at husband's marginal rate which will be 50% .17 Thus, without
considering other income or deductions of husband, some
$115,000 will be due the Internal Revenue Service.ls
The probable result of the tax assessment is a sale of all or a por-
tion of the husband's retained grassland to pay the taxes. This sale
will also result in tax liability, but this liability will be borne by
husband in the year of actual sale subsequent to 1982.
Conversely, the wife can sell her 5000 acres of the land at $125
17. The $230,000 amount is calculated by reducing the gross amount of long term cap-
ital gain by the I.R.C. § 1201 (1982) "Capital Gains Deduction" which is equal to 60% of the
gross figure and assumes that husband has no capital losses in the year of transfer.
18. This tax "bill" does not consider the possible effects of income averaging under
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per acre (the fair market value at the date of transfer from hus-
band) and will have no taxable gain: amount realized ($575,000)
less the adjusted basis ($575,000) equals no realized gain.
Husband's advisors should suggest alternatives to a convey-
ance of the land. Some possible alternatives are:
(1) Husband can borrow a sum of money, using the land as se-
curity, equal to one-half the fair market value of the land and pay
wife in cash:
(a) the borrowing of the money and mortgage of the property is
not a taxable event; 9 and
(b) transfer of cash in exchange for release of the marital rights
does not result in taxable gain to either husband or wife under
the Davis rules.
(2) As a second alternative, husband's attorney can present to
the court a tax analysis of the proposed settlement, considering
tax consequences. For example: if husband were to transfer 4500
acres to wife, the gain realized by husband would be $517,500 of
which $207,000 would be taxed.90 Husband's marginal rate will be
50%, thus there will be a tax of approximately $103,500. If we
look at the value of the 5500 acres retained by husband as being
$687,500 (5500 acres x $125 per acre) less the $103,500 tax, hus-
band is left with a value of $584,000 and wife's property has a
value of $562,500. Thus, by merely reducing the amount of prop-
erty transferred by 500 acres we have reached a much more equi-
table division of the property.
In summary, the rules of Davis should be considered in all
proposed property divisions incident to a dissolution under the
UMDA, and the possible tax results should be presented to the
client for his consideration. Davis cannot be ignored if there is a
transfer of separately owned appreciated property.
III. DIVISION OF JOINTLY OWNED PROPERTY
Most married couples in Montana own a large portion of their
marital estate as joint tenants with right of survivorship or as te-
nants in common. A property settlement in these instances con-
sists of severing the joint ownership, and if needed to provide an
equitable division, a cross-transfer of separately owned property.
Davis applies to these property settlements to the extent the divi-
sion varies from the interest of each spouse in the jointly owned
property.
19. Woodsom & Associates, Inc. v. Comm'r., 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952)..
20. The same computations are made here as at supra note 17.
[Vol. 44
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A. Revenue Ruling 74-347: The Service's Position
Revenue Ruling 74-34721 applied the Davis rules to a property
settlement involving jointly owned property. Neither spouse owned
much property at the time of marriage. The salaries of each spouse
were commingled during marriage and tracing of individual assets
to individual earnings were impossible. The jurisdiction involved
was a noncommunity property law state which provided an incho-
ate right in each spouse's separately owned property similar to
dower and courtesy. The jurisdiction also made provisions for an
equitable distribution of property on divorce.
The total fair market value of all property owned at the date
of divorce was $110,000, of which $70,000 was jointly owned and
$40,000 was in the husband's name alone. The divorce decree di-
vided the property equally: the wife got $55,000 worth of property
and the husband got a like amount. By the terms of the decree, the
husband was allowed to retain his $40,000 of separate property,
receiving $15,000 of the jointly owned property. The adjusted basis
of the jointly held property given to the wife was $27,500.
The Ruling concluded that the husband had made a taxable
transfer under the Davis rule even though all the property was di-
vided equally on the basis of ending value.2 2 The Service found
that there was an unequal division of the jointly owned property
and that the law of the jurisdiction did not give the wife an inter-
est in husband's separate property which amounted to co-owner-
ship. The Service, therefore, held that the husband recognized a
gain of $10,000:
(1) Amount Realized: Property received by wife of $55,000 less
one-half the jointly owned property ($35,000) equals $20,000
which is husband's amount realized;
(2) Adjusted Basis: To determine the adjusted basis of the ex-
cess jointly held property transferred to the wife, the Service used
this formula: adjusted basis -
net fair market value of excess
jointly owned property received X adjusted basis of jointly
fair market value of all jointly owned property received
owned property received
Applying this formula to the facts of the ruling:
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A/B = $20,000 X $27,500
$55,000
A/B = $10,000
(3) Gain Realized: The amount realized of $20,000 less the ad-
justed basis of $10,000 equals a $10,000 gain that is recognized.
As unfair as this result may seem, the Service is not taking an un-
supported position in Revenue Ruling 74-347. It seems accepted
that an unequal division of community property is taxable. Fur-
ther, in Robert K. Stevens2 3 the Tax Court held that a taxable
transfer occurred when the husband, pursuant to court order,
transferred to the wife his interest in some jointly owned real es-
tate; his gain realized was the amount by which the fair market
value of his interest exceeded the adjusted basis.
B. The Rationale for the Taxable Event
The taxable event occurs because of the unequal division of
jointly owned property resulting from the Davis rationale: the hus-
band conveyed appreciated property in consideration of wife's re-
lease of any claims she might have to the property retained by hus-
band; the wife's release is deemed to be an item of property equal
in value to the property she received. This theory can lead to some
very odd results:
Husband and wife own $100,000 of jointly owned property with
an adjusted basis of $10,000. Husband, anxious for a dissolution
of the marriage, agrees to convey all his right, title and interest in
the property to wife if wife will agree to a speedy dissolution. The
bargain is consummated and a dissolution is obtained.
Husband takes nothing from the marriage-except a tax bill.
Under the Davis rationale, the wife's claim is presumed to have a
value equal to the value of the property received: the husband's
$50,000 worth of jointly owned property. "4 Thus, the difference be-
tween the $50,000 amount realized and husband's one-half of the
$10,000 adjusted basis is husband's realized and recognized gain.
Revenue Ruling 74-347 sets forth this rule: in any situation
where one spouse receives more than his interest (presumably one-
half) in jointly owned appreciated property and where local law
does not accord that spouse an interest in the other spouse's indi-
vidually owned assets which rises to the status of co-ownership, the
spouse receiving less than a one-half interest in the jointly owned
23. 38 T.C. 345 (1962).
24. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co., 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. C1. 1954).
[Vol. 44
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property will realize a taxable gain.
C. Achieving an Equal Division
How is an equal division of property implemented? As Reve-
nue Ruling 74-347 implies, the Service has held that an equal divi-
sion or partition of jointly owned property does not result in recog-
nition of gain.25 The Service concluded that a division based on
approximately equal "ending values" is nontaxable. 6 Therefore,
receipt of various assets owned jointly but of equivalent value will
be treated as nontaxable, thereby deferring the tax recognition un-
til the property is sold by the recipient.27
D. The Optimum Settlement
The Service and the courts have shown the practitioner the
way to minimize taxation when the marital property consists solely
or largely of jointly owned property. The tax consequences attend-
ant to a dissolution dictate an equal division of jointly owned prop-
erty with each spouse retaining his separate property. For example,
in Zell v. Zell,25 the Montana Supreme Court upheld the district
court's division of property giving each spouse one-half of the joint
tenancy property, and leaving the property owned by each spouse
individually with that spouse. No adverse tax consequences would
be caused by the property division ordered by the district court. 9
IV. A SPECIES OF COMMON OWNERSHIP
A property settlement by division of jointly owned property
rather than transfer of separately owned property is preferable for
tax purposes. Accordingly, it is necessary to determine if property
is jointly owned for tax purposes. The Service stated that property
may be co-owned where:
(1) Title is to be taken jointly under state property law,
(2) The State is a community property law state, or
(3) State property law is found to be similar to community
property law.3 0
25. Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 C.B. 507.
26. Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158.
27. Practitioners must still be careful in analyzing the fairness of the disposition by
analyzing the inherent gain caused by the carryover of basis in each asset to the spouse
receiving it.
28. 174 Mont. 216, 570 P.2d 33 (1977).
29. See supra notes 25 and 26.
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The following discussion examines the third category of joint
ownership by reviewing three cases decided by the supreme courts
in the noncommunity property law states of Oklahoma, Colorado
and Kansas. These cases all hold that the applicable dissolution
laws create a "species of common ownership" in marital property
similar to community property. Thus, in these states, property set-
tlements which appear to be based on transfers of separately
owned property are transformed into divisions of jointly owned
property, achieving substantial income tax advantage. There are
important similarities between these cases and current Montana
law which raise the possibility of applying this doctrine to property
settlements under the UMDA with the attendant tax
consequences.
A. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Commissioner
Collins began in the Tax Court, 1 which held that a transfer of
appreciated property by the husband incident to a divorce in
Oklahoma was taxable under the rule of Davis. The husband ap-
pealed, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling
of the Commissioner.
3 2
The Oklahoma taxing authority also asserted a tax liability,
but the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the property division
did not subject the husband to any state tax liability because:
(1) the property divided was acquired during marriage (marital
property);
(2) applicable state law required the district court to divide
marital property "as may appear just and reasonable" upon
divorce;
(3) under Oklahoma law, "the nature of the wife's interest is
similar in conception to community property of community prop-
erty states, and is regarded as held by a species of common
ownership.
' 8
The settlement, therefore, amounted to a nontaxable division of
jointly owned property.
During the pendency of the state action, husband had ap-
pealed the decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to the
United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision for consideration in light
31. 46 T.C. 461 (1966) acq. 1970-2 C.B. XIX, aff'd., 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968),
vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 215 (1968), rev'd. and remanded, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir.
1969).
32. 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968).
33. Collins v. Okla. Tax Comm'n., 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968).
[Vol. 44
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of the Oklahoma Supreme Court holding."' On remand, the state
decision was followed, and the Commissioner's determination of a
tax deficiency was reversed.3"
Collins was the first state supreme court case in a noncom-
munity property state to find that the applicable state divorce laws
"create" a species of common ownership in marital property. In
analyzing the Oklahoma statute providing for the division of prop-
erty, the Oklahoma court emphasized that the divorce court was
required to make a division of property that was "just and reason-
able."36 The applicable Oklahoma statute read in part as follows:
As to such property, whether real or personal, as shall have been
acquired by the parties jointly during their marriage, whether the
title hereto be in either or both of said parties, the Court shall
make such division between the parties respectively as may ap-
pear just and reasonable, by a division of the property in kind, or
by setting the same apart to one of the parties, and requiring the
other thereof to pay such sum as may be just and proper to effect
a fair and just division thereof.
37
The court in Collins found that the record title of marital property
was irrelevant 8 and that "although one spouse brings separate
property to the marriage, enhanced value resulting from joint ef-
forts, skills or funds of both working together constitutes jointly
acquired property subject to division."3 9 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court also compared the Oklahoma statute to the Delaware statute
considered in Davis and found a "complete dissimilarity": the
wife's rights under Oklahoma law were those of ownership, not
merely a personal liability of husband.40
Collins was narrowed in its scope by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's holding in Sanditen v. Sanditen41 that the wife's owner-
ship interest in property acquired during marriage "depends upon
occurrence of a statutorily enacted contingency such as divorce,
separation, inability to support, homestead and death, all of which
emanate from the marriage relationship. A wife then has no vested
interest in property acquired during coverture but a contingent in-
terest which the law protects. '42 The "vesting" of this contingent
34. 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
35. 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
36. Collins, 446 P.2d at 295.
37. Id. at 295. OKLA. STAT. Tit. 12 § 1278 (1961).
38. Collins, 446 P.2d at 295.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 296.
41. 496 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1972).
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interest takes place, under the reasoning of the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court, by reason of divorce and not by reason of the mar-
riage relationship itself.43 Sanditen involved a claim by a wife al-
leging that her husband made gratuitous transfers to defendants
over a period of time of property acquired by the joint efforts of
wife and her husband during marriage and that those transfers
were made with the intent to defraud her of her marital and vested
rights. The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the wife's argument
that she had a vested interest in jointly acquired property. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court distinguished and limited the holding in
Collins by finding that the property interest of the wife vested only
"by reason of the divorce pendency under our statute and not by
reason of the marriage relationship.'
4
4
The similarities between Oklahoma law, as described in Col-
lins, and present Montana law are:
(1) The property division made upon a dissolution is statutorily
directed to be made on an "equitable" just and reasonable basis;4
(2) The status of the title of the property is largely irrelevant in
determining the equitable division;
46
(3) The wife's "contribution" must be considered by the court in
making the equitable division."
B. Questions re Imel v. United States
The holding in Collins, as interpreted and limited by
Sanditen, was adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in Ques-
tions re Imel v. United States.8 The taxpayer and his wife were
married for thirty-five years. In 1964, a divorce was granted by a
Colorado district court. The taxpayer and his wife negotiated a
property settlement, assigning the wife one-half of the marital
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (1981). See also Hebel v. Hebel, 176 Mont. 339, 578
P.2d 305 (1978) (district judge's discretion allowed him to dispose of any or all property,
however acquired or held).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (1981). See also Biegalke v. Biegalke, 172 Mont. 311,
564 P.2d 987 (1977) ("The title to or possession of property (except as to property not
acquired by the joint efforts of the parties) cannot defeat the power of the Court to make
such an adjustment").
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (1981). In determining "contribution," the court may
consider cash contributions; work or effort directly furthering the acquisition or increase in
value of marital assets; the performance of the ordinary duties of the wife or husband and
any extraordinary services performed by the wife or husband; and other matters in the indi-
vidual case which the court reasonably feels constitutes a "contribution, 'direct or indirect'
to such acquisition." Biegalke v. Biegalke, 172 Mont. 311, 564 P.2d 987 (1977).
48. 184 Colo. 1, 517 P.2d 1331 (1974).
[Vol. 44
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property (which at the date of divorce was in the name of the hus-
band alone) in recognition of the wife's active contribution to the
appreciation of the marital property. The Service assessed a tax
deficiency against the husband of approximately $92,000 plus in-
terest of almost $18,000.
The taxpayer paid the deficiency and claimed a refund. The
United States district judge certified a question to the Colorado
Supreme Court with regard to the wife's interest in the marital
property.' 9 The Colorado Supreme Court stated that the issue to
be resolved was whether a transfer of property from the husband
to the wife to acknowledge the wife's contribution to marital prop-
erty was a recognition of a "species of common ownership" and
thus a division of property or whether the transfer was a convey-
ance by the husband for the release of an "independent obligation
owed by him to his wife." 50
The Colorado Supreme Court found that the wife's interest in
the marital property amounted to a species of common ownership,
citing with approval the holding of Collins as explained and lim-
ited by Sanditen.5 The Colorado Supreme Court found that upon
the filing of a dissolution petition, the wife's interest in marital
property "vested".52 The source of the vested interest was the Col-
orado statute which directs the district court to divide marital
property "in such proportions as may be fair and equitable.""3 The
Colorado Supreme Court held, as did the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Sanditen, that the interest of the wife was merely an in-
choate right during marriage because the property to be trans-
ferred to her had not yet been determined." The court stated that
"except for those rights which vest upon the filing of the divorce
action, we in no way change the Colorado law that a husband's
property is free from any vested interest of the wife and, with a
possible exception of two, he can sell it or give it away." 55
C. Cady v. Cady
Kansas became the latest state to find "a species of common
ownership" existing under state divorce law. In Cady v. Cady, de-
49. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974), aff'd., 523 F.2d 853 (10th
Cir. 1975).
50. Imet, 184 Colo. at 3, 517 P.2d at 1332.
51. Id. at 6-7, 517 P.2d at 1333-34.
52. Id.
53. Id. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 46-1-13 (1963).
54. Id. at 9-10, 517 P.2d at 1335.
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cided in 1978, the Kansas Supreme Court stated:
We hold that a filing of a Petition for divorce or separate mainte-
nance creates a species of common or co-ownership in one spouse
in the jointly acquired property held by the other, the extent of
which is determined by the trial court pursuant to K.S.A. 1972
Supp. 60-1610(b). Except for those rights which vest by virtue of
the filing of the divorce action, we in no way change the interest
of one spouse in the property held by the other or in the ability of
the other spouse to convey, sell or give away such property. Our
decision is in accord with the cases decided by the Oklahoma and
Colorado Supreme Courts."
In Cady, the husband and wife were married in 1956, and were
divorced in 1973. The decree incorporated a property settlement
which provided for alimony and a division of property. The hus-
band agreed to assign to the wife 50,000 shares of stock held in his
name, while retaining other stock. All the stock had been acquired
during marriage. The Service issued a deficiency against the hus-
band on the basis of Davis.
The husband sought a declaratory judgment in the Kansas
state courts to determine the nature of the wife's interest. On the
basis of the Kansas statute, '7 prior Kansas case law, and the deci-
sions of Collins and Imel, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the
division of property at issue was a division of jointly owned prop-
erty and not a transfer of separate property. The Kansas legisla-
ture later codified the holding by amending the definition of mari-
tal property to provide that "each spouse has a common ownership
in marital property which vests at the time of commencement of
such action [for dissolution]." 58
D. Establishing the Species of Common Ownership Doctrine
Both Imel and Cady distinguished federal court decisions
which had previously determined that neither Colorado nor Kan-
sas law gave the wife vested ownership rights in property acquired
during marriage and held in the husband's name.59 The Davis doc-
trine is still viable in noncommunity property law states. A federal
56. 224 Kan. 339, 581 P.2d 358, 363 (1978).
57. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1060(b) (1972).
58. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-201(b) (1981).
59. The Colorado Supreme Court in Imel distinguished an earlier tenth circuit case,
David R. Pulliam, 39 T.C. 883 (1963), affd. 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 836 (1964). In Cady the Kansas Supreme Court distinguished the case of Richard E.
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district court in Iowa rejected the Collins rationale." The Tax
Court held in Dunn v. Commissioner, that under Tennessee law
wife has no vested interest in property acquired in husband's name
during marriage and therefore, a transfer of that property in a
property settlement is a taxable transaction."' Accordingly, absent
statutory provisions implementing the doctrine, 2 it appears that a
holding by a state supreme court is necessary before residents of
that state may successfully urge the "species of common owner-
ship" doctrine.
E. Montana and the Species of Common Ownership Doctrine
To determine the existence and effect of the "species of com-
mon ownership" doctrine in Montana, two questions must be an-
swered: (1) whether the Collins-Imel rationale is consistent with
Montana law; (2) whether the Collins-Imel holding would elimi-
nate the tax problems identified in parts II and III of this article.
Assuming that the Montana Supreme Court is presented with the
first question," a decision following the Collins-Imel" rationale
could be rendered based on the present status of Montana law.
As the examination of the Collins, Imel, and Cady decisions
shows, the basic concepts of Oklahoma, Colorado, and Kansas law
relating to property divisions on dissolutions are very similar to
those of Montana law." On the basis of these similarities, Montana
law also may be distinguished from the Delaware law applied in
Davis.66
The change in tax consequences caused by finding a species of
common ownership is generally favorable from the taxpayer's per-
spective. The concern is the extent of change or uncertainty in
other areas of Montana law that would be caused by the Collins-
Imel holding. The Imel court rejected the contention that a finding
of a species of common ownership would make Colorado a commu-
nity property state.6 7 The Colorado Supreme Court stated that its
holding in Imel caused no change in Colorado law other than the
60. Wallace v. U.S., 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971).
61. T.C. Memo 1977-156, 36 T.C.M. 664.
62. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c) (Smith-Hurd 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
452.330 (Vernon 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(k) (1981).
63. An initial consideration is in what context this issue will be presented to the Mon-
tana Supreme Court. It appears that the issue will not arise in any context other than a tax
controversy.
64. See supra text accompanying note 51.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
66. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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vesting of an inchoate property right on the filing of a petition for
dissolution of marriage.6 8 Apparently, vesting would necessitate
having both spouses join in the conveyance of property during the
pendency of a dissolution proceeding. This does not appear to be a
major change as most practitioners presently require the "non-ti-
tled" spouse to join in any conveyance for the purpose of releasing
his potential claim under the Montana elective share statutes.69
Other substantial or adverse changes are not apparent.
Does utilization of the Collins-Imel rationale eliminate all tax
complications? It can be suggested that the only effect of finding a
species of common ownership is to place the property division
under the rules governing divisions of jointly owned property and
that an unequal division of all marital property would have tax
consequences similar to those of an unequal division of property
owned as joint tenants or community property.70 Alternatively, it
might be suggested that finding a species of common ownership
does in fact result in the property division being completely non-
taxable in all cases decided in a jurisdiction adopting the species of
common ownership approach. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
rendered decisions in both Imel and Collins and language can be
found in both decisions supporting the argument that the state su-
preme court decision in each case rendered the property settle-
ment nontaxable."
Application of either suggestion will result in a general rule of
no taxable gain because of the very unique property interest ac-
corded the non-titled spouse in the Collins-Imel rationale. An ac-
cepted but unstated proposition in the decisions of both the Col-
lins and Imel state courts is that while the marital property may
not have been equally divided, each spouse got an amount of prop-
erty proportionate to his property interest. The only transfer,
therefore, is a division of property according to interest without
any rearranging of ownership of rights. For example, if tenant in
common Smith contributes one-third of the purchase price for a
parcel of real estate, and tenant in common Jones contributes the
other two-thirds, any subsequent division of the property on a ba-
sis other than the one-third/two-thirds ratio is a taxable transfer
between the tenants in common. The same rule applies to marital
property in which the non-titled spouse has a species of common
ownership: the wife's equitable share of marital property corre-
68. Id.
69. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-701 through -707 (1971).
70. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26. See also text accompanying notes 88-106.
71. See, e.g., Imel, 523 F.2d at 857.
190 [Vol. 44
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sponds to her proportional interest in the marital property. It fol-
lows that there can never be a division of marital property (assum-
ing one that is equitable and just) in a species of common
ownership jurisdiction that does not correspond to each spouse's
property interest. Community property is somewhat different in
that once property becomes in fact an asset of the marital commu-
nity, each spouse has equal ownership rights, and therefore, any-
thing varying from an equal division is taxable.
Finally, then, utilization of the Collins-Imel rationale will
eliminate tax complications of a property settlement involving dis-
tribution of marital property in kind to each spouse. Nonetheless,
divisions or settlements involving, for example, transfers of non-
marital cash or issuance of a promissory note to equalize divisions
will be taxable. This proposition is based on the development of
the "bargain and sale" doctrine in income taxation of property set-
tlements in community property states. As indicated, this doctrine
applies when, for example, the husband gives the wife his promis-
sory note in exchange for the wife's interest in the family business.
The Tax Court has deemed this to be a "sale" by the wife through
a "bargain" with the husband similar to a sale by one tenant in
common to another of his interest in property.72 This doctrine
could have application to a species of common ownership state be-
cause once the wife's interest in the marital property vests upon
filing of the petition for divorce, any subsequent disposition of that
interest, to the husband or any third party, will be a taxable event.
Accordingly, it is necessary to review the taxation of divisions
of community property to complete the tax analysis of the species
of common ownership rationale.
V. COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The Tax Court has recently stated the general rule governing
the tax consequences of a property settlement in one of the eight
community property states:
Where divorcing spouses in community property states make an
approximately equal division of the entire community property,
the partition is nontaxable, and the basis of the property set aside
to each spouse is its basis to the community prior to the
division.
71
72. Carrieres v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), aff'd per curium, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977).
73. Courtney L. Siewart, 72 T.C. 326 (1979). The eight community property states are:
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For example, a husband and wife own $30,000 in cash and $30,000
in stock, with the stock having been acquired in 1976 for $10,000
with the title in the husband's name alone. Upon divorce the wife
takes the stock and the husband retains the cash. In California, for
example, there would be no gain to either husband or wife, and the
wife would take a $10,000 basis in the stock.74 An approximately
equal division according to ending value is nontaxable in a commu-
nity property state. 5
A. Taxable Divisions of Community Property
Not every division of community property is nontaxable. In
Courtney L. Siewert, decided in 1979, the Tax Court cites two sit-
uations where a division of community property is taxable:
(1) where one spouse received property having an aggregate value
equal to substantially more than half the value of the entire com-
munity property; and (2) where one spouse gave his note or other
separate property for a substantial portion of the other spouse's
community property set aside to him.
The first taxable situation is the same as an unequal division
of jointly owned property in a noncommunity property law state.76
The second taxable situation is exemplified by Carrieres v. Com-
missioner7 7 in which the husband was awarded all of the wife's
community property share of stock in the family's closely held cor-
poration. In exchange, the husband was required to give up his
share of other community property, and to equalize the division,
he also had to come up with some "separate property" (cash). The
Tax Court held that to the extent the husband used his separate
property to pay for the wife's interest in the stock, the wife made a
sale to the husband and had to recognize gain accordingly. 8
To the extent husband, however, used his interest in other
community property to acquire the stock, no gain was realized.79
To illustrate this point, assume that a husband and wife own the
following property:
74. A Collins-Imel state would reach the same result. See supra text accompanying
notes 34-43.
75. Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935), and Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158,
would presumably lead to the same result in a Collins-Imel state.
76. See supra text accompanying note 21. This first taxable situation should not occur
in a Collins-Imel jurisdiction because property interests are not solely 50/50 but vary with
the equitable division.
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PROPERTY ADJUSTED BASIS FAIR MARKET VALUE
Cash $ 20,000 $ 20,000
Real Estate 10,000 60,000
Family Business 0 200,000
The realty and business are in the husband's name alone, but in
order to make the division in line with community property rules,
the court orders the following division:
PROPERTY HUSBAND WIFE
Cash $ 10,000 $ 10,000
Real Estate 30,000 30,000
Family Business 200,000 -
Note given by
husband to wife
to equalize value (100,000) 100,000
TOTAL $140,000 $140,000
Under Carrieres, the wife is treated as having sold her community
property interest in the business for the husband's note, a "bargain
and sale." Thus, the wife has gain of $100,000, the character of
which is probably long term capital gain.80 The wife's basis in the
note is $100,000 if she should be able to sell (discount) the note.
The wife will take a carryover basis in the other property. For ex-
ample, she will have a $5000 basis in her share of the real
property.81
If we put the parties in a Collins-Imel type of separate prop-
erty state and assume the wife's interest in the marital property
entitles her to one-half of such property, the results should follow
the community property rules. Thus, a holding that follows the
Collins-Imel rationale results in the "tax" of dissolution being
transferred from husband to wife just as in the bargain and sale
situation. The reason for the tax bears repeating: the wife's rights
have risen to the status of ownership rather than a claim on her
80. The Service could treat the transaction as being a sale of an interest in each asset
of the business and allocate the $100,000 accordingly. However, the wife can argue that the
asset sold was her property interest, a capital asset. The analysis of the "bargain and sale"
doctrine becomes very complex if, unlike Carrieres, more than one marital asset is left with
the husband thereby requiring determination of which asset has been sold. For an excellent
analysis of this problem, see Biblin, Divorce, Taxes and Community Property: Some Cur-
rent Cases, Problems and Concerns, U.S.C. TAx. INST. 571 (1978).
81. In a nontaxable division (or assets that are not deemed sold) there is a carryover
basis. See supra text accompanying note 85. Under the bargain and sale theory, the ad-
justed basis of the "buying" spouse is equal to one-half of the original adjusted basis in the
property plus the amount of consideration paid to the selling spouse. Rouse v. Comm'r., 6
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husband's assets, and thus the transaction is a disposition of the
wife's ownership rights rather than a satisfaction of the husband's
personal obligation.
VI. SUMMARY OF PARTS II-V
To recapitulate, in an analysis of possible tax consequences of
a proposed property settlement in Montana, the following must be
addressed:
How does title to the property stand?
(a) If the property is owned solely by one of the spouses,
subject only to an equitable claim of the other spouse on
dissolution, Davis rules will apply as detailed in part II of
this article.
(b) If the property is jointly owned in joint tenancy, com-
munity property, or the "Collins-Imel" species of common
ownership, it must be determined whether:
(1) there is a nontaxable division of the property ac-
cording to property interests;
(2) there is a taxable division of the property differing
from the property interests as discussed in part III of
this article; or
(3) there is a taxable "bargain and sale" involved as
discussed in part V of this article.
The questions to be asked are relatively simple. The issues raised,
however, by the Collins-Imel holding recognizing a species of com-
mon ownership and the application of the bargain and sale theory
pose difficulties.
VII. THE ROLE OF THE DISTRICT COURTS
This article began with the suggestion that any proposed prop-
erty settlement should be analyzed as to income tax consequences.
While the best time for this analysis to occur is at or before final
negotiation of the settlement, a Montana district court has the
duty to inquire into the "concrete" tax consequences of a court
ordered division of property.
The Montana Supreme Court has held that a district court
must consider "any concrete and immediate adverse tax impact
that a division of marital property might have on the parties. '8 2
Conversely, the court has also held that a district court "does not
abuse its discretion by refusing to consider theoretical tax conse-
quences when the court ordered property division does not con-
82. Beck v. Beck, - Mont. -, 631 P.2d 282, 285 (1981).
(Vol. 44
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template any taxable event which triggers present tax liability."83
To make the distinction between "concrete" and "theoretical,"
a district court must inquire into the tax consequences of every
property settlement. While the Montana Supreme Court decisions
could be read to require an analysis of tax consequences only in
those situations where the district court is making the division, it
seems equally important for the district court to determine
whether or not the parties to a negotiated settlement have consid-
ered the tax consequences before the court can approve the settle-
ment as being equitable. Further, it is prudent for practitioners to
make representations to the court in every case as to the tax analy-
sis undertaken in structuring the property settlement. The central
problem with considering every settlement is the expense in those
cases involving minimal property. It may be possible for the par-
ties to waive the analysis in a negotiated settlement, but the court
should be apprised of and approve such a waiver."'
VIII. CONCLUSION
Montana law now requires a consideration of "concrete" tax
consequences of a division of marital property. Once an analysis
has begun, which set of rules apply? While present Montana law
places Montana taxpayers in a position to argue that the Collins-
Imel rule applies, until the Montana Supreme Court so rules or the
legislature acts, the Davis rule will continue to govern in Montana
with its largely negative results from the taxpayer perspective.
The intrusion of potentially disastrous tax consequences into
the already emotional process of dissolving a marriage is unfortu-
nate, but adoption of the Collins-Imel rationale will substantially
lessen that intrusion.
83. Id. (citing Gilbert v. Gilbert, - Mont. - , 628 P.2d 1088 (1981)). For a discus-
sion of these two cases and the distinction between "concrete" and "theoretical" see Note,
Montana Supreme Court Survey-Family Law, 43 MoNT. L. REv. 317, 319 (1982). The
most common example of a "concrete" consequence would be the sale of the family resi-
dence. See In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 592 P.2d 1165, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413
(1979). "Theoretical" consequences would include tax consequences of a withdrawal of hus-
band from a partnership at some future unspecified time. See In re Marriage of Fonstein, 17
Cal. 3d 738, 552 P.2d 1169, 13 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1976). It is suggested that "immediate" versus
"speculative" would be more descriptive of the distinction the Montana Supreme Court was
making in Beck and Gilbert.
84. The waiver issue has not been considered by the Montana Supreme Court and
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